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FACEBOOK, CRIME PREVENTION, AND THE
SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH
DOCTRINE POST-CARPENTER
Connor M. Correll*
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects
people “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The
private search doctrine provides a notable exception to the
Fourth Amendment, providing that the government may
reconstruct a search previously performed by a private party
without first obtaining a warrant. The U.S. Supreme Court
developed the private search doctrine prior to the advent of the
internet; however, modern technology has changed the way that
individuals live. What was once done entirely in private is now
done alongside ever-present third parties, such as cell phones
and virtual assistants.
Facebook and other social media sites complicate Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence even further. Facebook collects a
vast amount of information from its users, which total over 300
million in the United States alone, in order to run its platform.
While some of this information, such as content posted on a
user’s timeline and lists of pages a user “likes,” is available to
other Facebook users, other information, such as cookies,
network and device information, and GPS location, is available
only to Facebook.
What happens if Facebook voluntarily discloses user
information to law enforcement, either to help solve a crime or
to prevent possible commission of a crime, without law
enforcement first seeking to legally obtain that information?
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, United States v. Jones
and Carpenter v. United States, provide the Court with a
pathway to protecting this information under the Fourth
*
J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Georgia School of Law; B.S., 2018, Wingate
University. The author thanks Professor Thomas E. Kadri for his advice regarding this Note
and Kassidy Correll for her love and constant support.
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Amendment. In Jones, a “shadow-majority” of the Court
concluded that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the aggregated sum of their public movements
revealed by GPS monitoring and are therefore afforded Fourth
Amendment protection. The Court in Carpenter cemented this
reasoning by holding that individuals maintain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in years of location information compiled
by wireless carriers and that wireless carries violate the Fourth
Amendment when they provide that information to the
government absent a warrant.
This Note argues that, based on the reasoning of Carpenter
and Jones, individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in social media information that is not otherwise
viewable by other users and that this information should
therefore be afforded Fourth Amendment protection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since becoming available in 2004, Facebook has come to hold an
important, almost indispensable place in the lives of millions of
people in the United States.1 Facebook has fundamentally changed
the ways that we communicate: what used to be done by letter,
email, or even face-to-face conversation is now often done by posting
to a “friend’s” timeline or sending them a private message through
Facebook Messenger.2 Accompanying this communication
revolution is a seismic shift in technology that has made it easier
for Facebook to monitor its 302 million users in the United States.3
Facebook collects a vast amount of information from its users—
ranging from posts, messages, and basic information provided when
users create their accounts, to network and device information,
cookie data, and recent activity—to provide a better experience
across its platforms.4 While some of the information that Facebook
collects is available to other users, such as content posted on
timelines and lists of pages “liked” by users, many types of
information are not available to other Facebook users.5 The
information available to users includes content such as recently
read articles, active sessions, and pages and user profiles recently
viewed, among other forms of information.6
Facebook also provides some of the user information that it
collects to law enforcement.7 Some policies are intended to protect
1 See John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 1,
2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/01/facts-about-americans-andfacebook/ (explaining how prevalent Facebook use is in the United States).
2 See Statista Rsch. Dep’t, Most Popular Global Mobile Messaging Apps 2021, STATISTA
(Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/258749/most-popular-global-mobilemessenger-apps (noting that there are 1.3 billion monthly active users on Facebook
Messenger as of October 2021).
3 Statista Rsch. Dep’t, United States: Number of Facebook Users 2017–2025, STATISTA (Aug.
23, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/408971/number-of-us-facebook-users.
4 See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy (last visited Jan. 29,
2022) (describing the types of information that Facebook collects).
5 See id. (explaining that Facebook collects public information, such as communications
with other users, as well as private information that others cannot see, such as device
information, connections and network information, and usage information).
6
What Categories of My Facebook Data Are Available to Me?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/930396167085762 (last visited Jan. 29, 2022).
7
See
Information
for
Law
Enforcement
Authorities,
FACEBOOK,
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those at risk of self-harm: Facebook’s current suicide prevention
policy allows users to report posts that may indicate that a user is
contemplating self-harm; trained members of Facebook’s
Community Operations team then review these reported posts and
can connect the users to mental health resources.8 In addition to
receiving reports from users, Facebook uses artificial intelligence to
provide help to those users who need it.9 When a Facebook team
member or computer algorithm determines that an individual is at
imminent risk of self-harm, Facebook contacts first responders and
police to conduct a wellness check on that person.10 Other policies
are linked to criminal behavior: while Facebook does not have such
a robust reporting procedure for criminal behavior, the site does
provide information to law enforcement to “help them respond to
emergencies, including those that involve the immediate risk of
harm, suicide prevention and the recovery of missing children.”11
Facebook may also supply police “with information to help prevent
or respond to fraud and other illegal activity, as well as violations
of the Facebook Terms.”12
What happens if Facebook voluntarily discloses user information
to law enforcement, either to help solve a crime or to prevent the
possible commission of a crime, without law enforcement first
seeking to legally obtain that information? While Facebook claims
that it is attuned to privacy concerns,13 Facebook and other social
https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2022) (detailing
Facebook policies that relate to providing information to law enforcement).
8 See
Suicide
Prevention,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/safety/wellbeing/suicideprevention (last visited Jan. 29, 2022)
(outlining Facebook’s suicide prevention policy).
9 See Catherine Card, How Facebook AI Helps Suicide Prevention, META (Sept. 10, 2018,
6:00 AM), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/09/inside-feed-suicide-prevention-and-ai/ (“This
[machine learning] tool uses signals to identify posts from people who might be at risk, such
as phrases in posts and concerned comments from friends and family.”).
10 See Suicide Prevention, supra note 8 (explaining when Facebook contacts emergency
services for mental health support); see also Card, supra note 9 (noting that Facebook
contacted first responders to conduct over 1,000 wellness checks within the first year of
implementing its machine learning suicide prevention tool).
11
Facebook
and
Law
Enforcement,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law (last visited Jan. 27, 2022).
12 Id.
13 See id. (stating that Facebook “take[s] the privacy of [user] information very seriously”).
Despite Facebook’s assurances, it has a history of major user data leaks. For example, the
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media giants are keenly aware of their ability to keep communities
safe and advance social interests by providing law enforcement with
certain user information.14 One need only look to the debate
surrounding allegations of social media sites censoring conservative
speech on their networks—in particular, over revoking Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act15 and former President Donald
Trump’s ban from nearly all major social media platforms16—to see
a recent example of technology giants wrestling with the idea of
what their role in society should be.17 Thus, there is a need to
Cambridge Analytical scandal leading up to the 2016 United States presidential election
involved a data firm improperly accessing the data of 87 million Facebook users. Cecilia Kang
& Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Says Cambridge Analytica Harvested Data of Up to 87 Million
Users, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/markzuckerberg-testify-congress.html. Despite Facebook’s claims that it implemented sweeping
measures to curb potential data leaks, the social media company continued to fall victim to
leaks. See Michael Nuñez, Facebook Is Still Leaking Data More Than One Year After
Cambridge
Analytica,
FORBES
(Nov.
5,
2019,
7:53
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mnunez/2019/11/05/facebook-is-still-leaking-data-more-thanone-year-after-cambridge-analytica/ (noting that 100 application developers accessed user
data improperly in 2019).
14 See Facebook and Law Enforcement, supra note 11 (“We work with law enforcement to
help people on Facebook stay safe.”); Snapchat Safety Center, SNAP INC., https://snap.com/enUS/safety/safety-center (last visited Jan. 29, 2022) (“Snap is deeply committed to the safety
and wellbeing of our community, and our teams, products, policies, and partnerships apply
safety by design principles to keep Snapchatters safe and informed.”); Information for Law
Enforcement, SNAP INC., https://snap.com/en-US/safety/safety-enforcement (last visited Jan.
29, 2022) (explaining that Snapchat reviews allegations of “potential child exploitation
content” and may report “such situations to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children”).
15 47 U.S.C. § 230. Section 230 prohibits treating internet service providers as publishers
and shields such providers from civil liability for restricting access to certain material. Id. §
230(c).
16 See Alex Hern, Opinion Divided over Trump’s Ban from Social Media, GUARDIAN (Jan.
11, 2021, 1:17 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/11/opinion-divided-overtrump-being-banned-from-social-media (detailing the technology firms that banned Trump
and the arguments for and against the firms’ decisions).
17 See, e.g., Tony Romm, Rachel Lerman, Cat Zakrzewski, Heather Kelly & Elizabeth
Dwoskin, Facebook, Google, Twitter CEOs Clash with Congress in Pre-Election Showdown,
WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/28/twitterfacebook-google-senate-hearing-live-updates/ (summarizing the Senate Commerce
Committee’s hearing with Twitter, Facebook, and Google executives regarding Section 230
and alleged censoring of conservative speech on social media). Commentators described a
Senate hearing on these issues as leaving “Facebook, Google and Twitter facing conflicting
pressures—from Democrats who say they should patrol their sites and services more
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determine what information, if any, a social media company such as
Facebook can disclose to law enforcement absent a warrant.
Based on reasoning from recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, this
Note argues that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in social media information not otherwise viewable by other
users and that such information thus ought to be afforded Fourth
Amendment protection. This Note starts by exploring Facebook’s
data collection policies and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
specifically focusing on how the U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with
technology developments. Next, this Note argues that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in non-public social media
information in two parts: First, this Note demonstrates that data
collected by Facebook provides a wealth of information that can be
used to gain insight into significant parts of an individual’s life.
Second, because Facebook is such an indispensable part of many
users’ lives, and because Facebook collects information even when
an individual is not using Facebook at a given time, this Note
explains that individuals cannot avoid having their information
collected and potentially distributed, short of deleting their
accounts. This Note then proposes a bright-line rule for when law
enforcement should need a warrant to view this information and
responds to potential criticism of this approach.

II. FACEBOOK’S COLLECTION OF USER DATA
Facebook collects individual information to provide a better
experience for its users across its platforms, including Facebook,
Messenger, Instagram, WhatsApp, and other products.18 Facebook
collects user information, such as content that is shared with other
users and basic information that individuals provide when they sign

aggressively and Republicans who felt the companies should have a more hands-off role with
most political speech.” They also noted that “[t]he mixed signals threatened to add new
complications to the tech giants’ already controversial work to protect the world’s most
popular digital communications channels from abuse.” Id.
18 See Data Policy, supra note 4 (describing what types of information Meta, the parent
company of Facebook, collects); Sam Shead, Facebook Owns the Four Most Downloaded Apps
of the Decade, BBC (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50838013 (noting
that Facebook, now called Meta, owns the four most downloaded apps of the 2010s: Facebook,
Messenger, WhatsApp, and Instagram).
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up for an account.19 This basic information includes data such as
locations where pictures were taken and dates that files were
created.20 In addition to the information that other users,
particularly a user’s “friends” or “followers,” may view, Facebook
collects more obscure information that “friends” and “followers”
cannot access. This hidden information includes the types of content
that users engage with; payment information; network, device, and
connection information; and cookie data.21 Because of the
significance of this inaccessible information, this Section now
expounds upon each of these categories in turn.
First, Facebook collects information about the types of content
with which its users interact.22 Facebook uses much of this data to
tailor content and advertising to individual users.23 For example,
Facebook maintains a list of advertisement topics that it may target
against a particular user based on that user’s “likes, interests and
other data.”24 Similarly, Facebook curates a collection of Facebook
Watch topics to show users relevant videos based on their
interaction history with previous videos and pages they have
“liked.”25

19 See Data Policy, supra note 4 (“We collect the content, communications and other
information you provide when you use our Products, including when you sign up for an
account, create or share content, and message or communicate with others.”). Facebook also
allows its users to provide information in their profile relating to significant life events,
political and religious views, philosophical beliefs, and racial or ethnic origin. Id. Sharing this
information is optional, and even if users choose to provide this information to Facebook, they
can restrict who may view it. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See What Categories of My Facebook Data Are Available to Me?, supra note 6 (explaining
that Facebook collects a user’s recent activities; searches; active sessions, meaning “date,
time, device, IP address, machine cookie and browser information”; recently viewed ads;
recently read articles; how many times a user visits the site’s Dating, Marketplace, and
Events sections; recently visited event pages; recently watched live videos; the number of
times a user interacts with Facebook groups; games played; pages and people a user recently
viewed; and videos watched, including the amount of time spent watching particular videos).
23 See Data Policy, supra note 4 (explaining that Facebook uses the information that it
collects to provide personalized content and features to users’ timelines, make suggestions,
and effectively tailor advertisements and other sponsored content).
24 What Categories of My Facebook Data Are Available to Me?, supra note 6.
25 Id. Facebook also curates a similar collection of topics for a user’s News Feed. Id.
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Second, Facebook also collects information pertaining to users’
network, device, and connection information.26 The site records
recent activity from a user’s specific IP address, including message
activity, payment activity, logins, active sessions, pages visited, and
logouts.27 This information also helps Facebook to detect whether a
device may be a bot.28 Furthermore, Facebook collects information
from devices such as Bluetooth signals, nearby Wi-Fi points, and
nearby cell towers.29 If a user has the device location settings turned
on, Facebook also collects data from GPS locations.30 Facebook uses
this information to provide users with content relevant to their
locality and in their language and to make suggestions based on a
user’s current location, such as nearby events.31
Third, Facebook extensively retains cookie data from cookies
stored on a user’s device.32 Facebook defines cookies as “small pieces
of text used to store information on web browsers” and “to store and
receive identifiers and other information on computers, phones and

Data Policy, supra note 4.
What Categories of My Facebook Data Are Available to Me?, supra note 6; see also
Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Joint Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp. and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 26 (2018)
[hereinafter Facebook Data Hearing] (statement of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and CEO,
Facebook, Inc.) (noting that it is common to collect website user information). Facebook also
collects the unique identification numbers of devices used to log onto Facebook, the country
and language of those devices, and the user’s most recent location recorded by the devices.
What Categories of My Facebook Data Are Available to Me?, supra note 6. In addition,
Facebook collects device attributes such as signal strength, browser type, hardware and
software versions, and available storage. Data Policy, supra note 4.
28 Facebook Data Hearing, supra note 27, at 26 (stating that Facebook collects device
information to look for signs that a device is a bot or that an account is inauthentic). “Bots
are large numbers of automated accounts controlled by single users.” Bots Blamed for COVID
Misinformation on Facebook, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 7, 2021),
https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2021-06-07/bots-blamed-for-covidmisinformation-on-facebook. Bots can repeatedly share Facebook posts to influence users
with misinformation. Id.
29 Data Policy, supra note 4.
30 Id.
31 See Data Policy, supra note 4 (“We use the information we have (subject to choices you
make) . . . [to p]rovide measurement, analytics, and other business services . . . [, p]romote
safety, integrity and security . . . [, c]ommunicate with you . . . [and r]esearch and innovate
for social good.”).
32 Id.
26
27

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

9

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 [2021], Art. 6

796

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:787

other devices.”33 Cookies allow Facebook to track user activity,
including when users are logged in and the browser from which a
user accesses Facebook.34 Facebook places cookies on individuals’
computers or devices and receives information that is stored in
cookies when individuals use Facebook products, third-party
applications, and websites that use Facebook products and
technologies.35 Facebook uses cookies if a person has a Facebook
account and uses Facebook products so that Facebook can better
understand the information that it receives from users, including
information about their use of third-party applications and
websites.36
Whenever a person visits an application or a website that
features Facebook technologies—including the Facebook “comment”
or “like” buttons—Facebook “automatically log[s] (i) standard
browser or app records of the fact that a particular device or user
visited the website or app . . . and (ii) any additional information the
publisher of the app or website chooses to share with Facebook
about the person’s activities on that site.”37 Millions of websites
feature the Facebook “like” button, and hundreds of millions of
webpages include the Facebook “share” button.38 Because thirdparty applications and websites using Facebook’s features do not
know whether an individual is logged into Facebook when they visit
their pages, Facebook even receives information from these pages
about individuals who are logged out or do not have a Facebook
33
Cookies
&
Other
Storage
Technologies,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/policies/cookies/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2022). Facebook uses cookies
to help verify accounts; determine when users are logged in; keep users’ accounts, data, and
Facebook products secure and safe; show tailored advertisements; provide better
functionality and performance; and to create analytics for research; among other purposes.
Id.
34
See @Seralahthan, Facebook Cookies Analysis, MEDIUM (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://medium.com/@TechExpertise/facebook-cookies-analysis-e1cf6ffbdf8a (identifying and
describing some of the more important cookies that Facebook uses).
35 See id. (explaining where Facebook uses cookies); Facebook Data Hearing, supra note 27,
at 255 (statement of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and CEO, Facebook, Inc.) (stating that
Facebook servers automatically log people’s cookies when they visit websites and apps that
feature Facebook technologies, including the Facebook “like” and “comment” buttons).
36 Cookies & Other Storage Technologies, supra note 33.
37 Facebook Data Hearing, supra note 27, at 255 (statement of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman
and CEO, Facebook, Inc.).
38 Id.
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profile.39 Facebook purports, however, that it does not use cookies
to maintain profiles of non-Facebook users.40 This is a small number
of people, though, since more than three billion individuals globally
have Facebook accounts.41

III. BACKGROUND ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. DEFINING A “SEARCH” UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”42 The essential purpose of the
Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”43
Historically, to determine whether a government action constituted
a Fourth Amendment search, courts used a trespass analysis that
asked whether the government physically intruded onto an area
protected by the U.S. Constitution to obtain the information at
issue.44 Today, however, courts also inquire into a person’s
39 See David Baser, Hard Questions: What Data Does Facebook Collect When I’m Not Using
Facebook, and Why?, META (Apr. 16, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/04/data-offfacebook/ (“When you visit a site or app that uses our services, we receive information even if
you’re logged out or don’t have a Facebook account. This is because other apps and sites don’t
know who is using Facebook.”); see also What Information Does Facebook Get When I Visit a
Site with the Like Button?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/186325668085084
(last visited Jan. 29, 2022) (stating that individuals who visit a site with a Facebook plugin
that do not have Facebook accounts send Facebook “a more limited set of info”). “[P]lugins,
like the Like button, the Share button and comments, are tools that let you share your
experiences on other websites with your friends on Facebook.” How do Social Plugins Work
on Facebook?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/203587239679209 (last visited Jan.
29, 2022).
40 See Facebook Data Hearing, supra note 27, at 299 (statement of Mark Zuckerberg,
Chairman and CEO, Facebook, Inc.) (“We do not use web browsing data to show ads to nonusers or otherwise store profiles about non-users.”).
41 See Company Info, FACEBOOK, https://about.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2022) (stating the number of Facebook users around the world); Statista Rsch. Dep’t, supra
note 3 (stating that Facebook had over 2.85 billion active monthly users in 2020).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct.,
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
44 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (holding that “a compulsory
production of a man’s private papers to establish a criminal charge against him” violates the
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reasonable expectation of privacy to determine when a search occurs
for Fourth Amendment purposes.45 Thus, the inquiry for whether
the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s expectation of privacy
from government searches turns on reasonableness.46
The U.S. Supreme Court established that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places” in Katz v. United States.47
In Katz, FBI agents attached a device to the outside of a public
telephone booth that Petitioner Katz used to transmit wagers to
individuals in other cities.48 The Court held that the FBI agents
violated Katz’s “privacy upon which he justifiably relied” while
using the phone booth.49 While the Katz majority used an
expectation-of-privacy analysis, Justice Harlan’s concurrence
offered a two-part inquiry for determining when a Fourth
Amendment search occurs, stating that the Fourth Amendment
affords protection when a person displays an actual expectation of
privacy and when “society is prepared to recognize” that expectation
as a reasonable one.50 In later cases, the Court adopted Justice
Harlan’s two-part inquiry as the leading test to determine whether
a search occurred.51
Fourth Amendment under a trespass analysis); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464
(1928) (finding that wiretapping telephone wires on a public street did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search because the government did not enter into the defendants’ offices or
houses), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (noting that this
trespass inquiry was the test “at least until the latter half of the 20th century” (first citing
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); and then citing Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 801 (2004))).
45 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining a reasonable expectation of
privacy approach to determine whether a Fourth Amendment search occurred); e.g., Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014) (adopting the reasonable expectation of privacy test).
46 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 381–82 (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness.’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006))).
47 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion).
48 Id. at 348.
49 Id. at 353.
50 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 213–15 (1986) (adopting the two-part
inquiry to hold that a search did not occur when police officers flew a plane over the
respondent’s house and saw marijuana plants growing in the yard); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 737, 740–42 (1979) (applying Justice Harlan’s Katz analysis to hold that the
petitioner did not have “a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ regarding the numbers he dialed
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B. THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE

Under the private search doctrine, the government may
reconstruct a search previously performed by a private party
without first obtaining a warrant.52 Because the Fourth
Amendment applies only to government searches, private
individuals may conduct searches of their own.53 The private search
doctrine arises from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in United
States v. Jacobsen.54 The Jacobsen Court held that a subsequent
government search of a package containing a white, powdery
substance did not violate the Fourth Amendment because FedEx
employees had previously searched the same container.55 There, the
doctrine allowed the government to reconstruct a private search—
even where the contents were not necessarily in plain view—when
it was virtually certain that the inspection would not tell the
government anything more than what the private search already
revealed.56 The scope of the government search was limited to the
physical container that was searched by the private party.57 Thus,
Jacobsen held that a subsequent government search does not violate
the Fourth Amendment because the owner holds “no legitimate

on his phone” that were recorded by a pen register installed by the telephone company).
Notably, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test does not displace the property-based test
but is rather an addition to that test. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012)
(“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test.”).
52 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119 (1984) (holding that an individual has
no privacy interest in a package that was previously examined by a private party).
53 See id. at 113 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not regulate private conduct).
54 See id. at 126 (“[T]he federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally protected
privacy interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of private conduct.”).
55 See id. at 119‒20 (“The agent’s viewing of what a private party had freely made available
for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
56 See id. at 118–19 (“Even if the white powder was not itself in ‘plain view’ because it was
still enclosed in so many containers and covered with papers, there was a virtual certainty
that nothing else of significance was in the package and that a manual inspection of the tube
and its contents [by the Drug Enforcement Administration agent] would not tell him anything
more than he already had been told.”).
57 See id. at 119 (explaining that the respondents had no privacy interest in the contents of
the package because it remained unsealed and because FedEx employees had examined it
before the government viewed its contents).
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expectation of privacy” in contents already searched by a private
party.58
Jacobsen limits the application of the private search doctrine in
many respects. First, the private party that initially conducts the
search must reveal its findings to the government before the
government may conduct its own search.59 Second, as mentioned
above, the government’s subsequent search may not go beyond the
scope of the private party’s initial search.60 Meeting this
requirement means that the government must have “virtual
certainty” that its subsequent search will not reveal anything more
than what the initial private search already revealed.61 Third, some
courts applying Jacobsen hold that the private search doctrine does
not apply when the search is of a hotel room.62 Since Jacobsen, the
influence of technology has prompted disagreement over what
constitutes a “search” in the digital context, particularly when
private technology companies collect and have the ability to search
through vast amounts of personal information.63
C. THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

Also relevant to a user’s privacy interest in information stored
online is the Stored Communications Act (SCA).64 Enacted in 1986,
Congress intended for the SCA to provide privacy protections to
Id. at 120.
See id. at 117 (“It is well-settled that when an individual reveals private information to
another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the
authorities . . . . The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information
with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.”); see also
United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that the private search
doctrine follows from a private party revealing private information to the government).
60 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.
61 See D’Andrea, 648 F.3d at 9 (“[A]n antecedent private search does not amount to a free
pass for the government to rummage through a person’s effects.”).
62 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has applied this principle. See, e.g., United States v.
Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997) (declining to extend the private search doctrine to
the private search of motel rooms); United States v. Spicer, 432 F. App’x 522, 524 (6th Cir.
2011) (declining to extend the private search doctrine to hotel rooms).
63 See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 537
(2005) (identifying the difficulty of applying the Fourth Amendment “to the retrieval of data”
from computers). For further discussion, see infra Section III.C.
64 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13.
58
59
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computer communications that were not covered by the traditional
trespass analysis of the Fourth Amendment.65 Section 2702 of the
SCA prohibits entities providing electronic communication service
or remote computing service to the public from voluntarily divulging
the contents of communications “in electronic storage” or “carried or
maintained on that service” “to any person or entity,” as well as
“a[ny] record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or
customer of such service . . . to any governmental entity.”66
It is unclear whether and to what extent the SCA applies to
modern technology, such as Facebook, due to the statute’s archaic
understanding of technology.67 For example, the statute only
applies to entities that provide electronic communication services
(ECS) or remote computing services (RCS), but a provider can act
as an RCS in one instance, an ECS in another instance, and as
neither in others.68 It is also unclear whether social media is
governed by the SCA’s ECS or RCS provisions.69 On top of this, the
SCA’s prohibition on voluntary disclosure of a user’s information
only pertains to information related to content, meaning
“communication that a person wishes to share or communicate with
another person.”70 The SCA’s provision regarding “a record or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such
service”71 refers to non-content information, which is defined as
“information about the communication that the network uses to
deliver and process the content information.”72 Thus, the SCA’s
65 See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208–13 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, A
User’s Guide] (explaining why Congress enacted the SCA).
66 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(3).
67 See Christopher J. Borchert, Fernando M. Pinguelo & David Thaw, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy Settings: Social Media and the Stored Communications Act, 13 DUKE
L. & TECH. REV. 36, 45–46 (2015) (explaining how the language of the SCA, which was
“drafted in the 1980s, fail[s] to provide an easily adaptable framework,” especially for
technology that does not fit neatly within its language).
68 See Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 65, at 1215 (“The classifications of ECS and RCS
are context sensitive: the key is the provider’s role with respect to a particular copy of a
particular communication, rather than the provider’s status in the abstract.”).
69 See Borchert et al., supra note 67, at 57 (noting the SCA’s lack of clarity regarding
protection of social media users).
70 Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 65, at 1228.
71 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3).
72 Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 65, at 1228.
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prohibitions might not apply when an individual uses Facebook for
noncommunicative purposes, such as browsing different pages or
scrolling through a timeline.
Scholars have called for Congress to amend the SCA to apply the
language more clearly to modern technology.73 As the SCA currently
stands, courts disagree about how to apply the statute to new
technologies such as Facebook.74 While scholars and courts debate
how the SCA applies to this information and what can be done to
amend it, this Note argues that the Court’s current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence prohibits disclosure of non-public
Facebook information to police without needing to point to any
particular statute.
D. THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE

Advances in technology have forced courts to re-tool their Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Starting in Katz, the U.S. Supreme
Court extended the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis to
protect individuals from unreasonable government searches in
areas where the historical trespass-based analysis would otherwise
have not.75 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
physical and electronic intrusions into a place where an individual
exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy and where that
expectation is reasonable.76 As technology has made it easier for the
government to surveil areas that were once thought of as private,
73 E.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
373, 419 (2014) (arguing that sweeping reform to the SCA and other privacy laws is necessary
because “[t]oday’s Internet has diverged in profound ways from the Internet that existed
when Congress last enacted major reform”); Borchert et al., supra note 67, at 65 (“[T]his
Article suggests Congress amend the SCA in order to ensure the Act achieves its original
intent . . . [and] further recommends Congress adopt technology-neutral statutory language
to more effectively protect communications content now and in the future.”).
74 See Borchert et al., supra note 67, at 48, 53 (noting that courts disagree over whether an
internet service provider “is acting as a provider of ECS or RCS with regard to a particular
communication” and which communications made on social networking platforms receive
SCA protection).
75 See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
76 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[E]lectronic
as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
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the Court has acted to “assure[] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”77 The Court has used this reasoning to
prohibit the government from using technology not readily made
available to the public, such as thermal imagers, to explore what
occurs within an individual’s home without a warrant.78
Cell phones and GPS have further complicated Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court noted in Riley
v. California that cell phones have become “a pervasive and
insistent part of daily life,” and “a significant majority of American
adults now own such phones.”79 Due to the vast amounts of personal
information contained in cell phones, officers generally must obtain
a warrant before conducting a search of one.80 Cell phones feature
immense storage capacity and can store many different kinds of
information.81 These capabilities make it possible to reconstruct
“[t]he sum of an individual’s private life” through information that
dates back to when the phone was purchased, and as is often the
case, even earlier.82 Similarly, in United States v. Jones, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that placing a GPS tracker on a car for twentyeight days constituted a Fourth Amendment search.83 Although the
Jones majority used a trespass analysis to conclude that the
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
See id. at 35–36 (reasoning that allowing the government to use a thermal imager on
petitioner’s home to measure heat radiating from its side and roof “would leave the
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—including imaging technology that could
discern all human activity in the home”).
79 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
80 See id. at 386 (“Cell phones, however, place vast quantities of personal information
literally in the hands of individuals.”). The Riley Court likened the government’s argument
that data stored on a cell phone is virtually the same as other physical items to “saying a ride
on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of
getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together.” Id. at 393.
Privacy concerns implicated in the data stored on cell phones go far beyond those implicated
by the search of physical items. Id.
81 See id. at 394 (“Even the most basic phones that sell for less than $20 might hold
photographs, picture messages, text messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a
thousand-entry phone book, and so on.”).
82 See id. at 394–95 (describing the consequences that cell phone data presents for privacy).
Data such as browsing history, location information, and applications that manage a person’s
detailed information all make it easy for third parties to learn the most intimate details of a
person’s life from a cell phone alone. Id. at 395–96.
83 565 U.S. 400, 403–04 (2012).
77
78
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government conducted a search under the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,84 a “shadow majority” made up of Justice Alito and the
three Justices who joined his concurring opinion (Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan), plus Justice Sotomayor who concurred alone,85
concluded that the GPS data became something more than mere
location data because of the large amount of information collected
and the inferences that the government could make from it.86 The
five concurring Justices in Jones—especially Justice Sotomayor—
touched on a “mosaic approach” to the Fourth Amendment, which
focuses on the aggregated sum of an individual’s public movements
that GPS monitoring entails.87 Justice Sotomayor suggested that
individuals do not reasonably expect that the government would
aggregate their individual movements, which would allow the
government to gather substantial information about a person’s
private life.88

84 See id. at 404–05 (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose
of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).
85 Margot E. Kaminski, Response, Carpenter v. United States: Big Data is Different, GEO.
WASH. L. REV.: ON THE DOCKET (July 2, 2018), https://www.gwlr.org/carpenter-v-unitedstates-big-data-is-different.
86 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such
offenses, society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—
and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”).
87 See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
320 (2012) [hereinafter Kerr, The Mosaic Theory] (“The mosaic theory requires courts to apply
the Fourth Amendment search doctrine to government conduct as a collective whole rather
than in isolated steps. Instead of asking if a particular act is a search, the mosaic theory asks
whether a series of acts that are not searches in isolation amount to a search when considered
as a group.”).
88 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (detailing the extent of
information gathered by GPS monitoring, such as “familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations”); see also Kerr, The Mosaic Theory, supra note 87, at 328 (“Justice
Sotomayor focuses on whether a person has Fourth Amendment rights ‘in the sum’ of their
public movements, rather than in individual movements. . . . Justice Sotomayor [also] asks
whether people reasonably expect that their movements not only will be recorded but also
‘aggregated.’”).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss2/6

18

Correll: Facebook, Crime Prevention, and the Scope of the Private Search Post-Carpenter

2022] FACEBOOK & THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE

805

In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court cemented its prior reasoning
from Riley v. California89 and Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning from
Jones in Carpenter v. United States.90 Carpenter involved an
individual suspected of robbing Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores.91
After another suspect identified Carpenter as an accomplice in the
robberies, prosecutors applied for Carpenter’s phone records under
the SCA, which features a standard lower than the probable cause
threshold usually needed to obtain this information.92 From the
prosecutors’ granted SCA application, federal magistrate judges
ordered MetroPCS and Sprint—two wireless carriers Carpenter
used—to disclose cell site location information (CSLI) for
Carpenter’s cell phone for the four-month period in which the
robberies occurred.93 MetroPCS “produced records spanning 127
days,” and Sprint “produced two days of records,” culminating in the
government obtaining “12,898 location points cataloging
Carpenter’s movements.”94 The government used this information
to charge and convict Carpenter at trial, and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.95
The government in Carpenter argued that the third-party
doctrine96 applied to Carpenter’s CSLI records.97 Similar to the
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
See 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (explaining that the collected data from the cell
phone location records at issue contravened the privacy expectation set out in Riley and
presented an even larger privacy concern than the data considered in Jones); see also
Kaminski, supra note 85 (“[T]he central move in Carpenter stems from Justice Sotomayor’s
opinion in Jones and Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Riley.”).
91 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
92 Id. at 2212–13. The Court noted that the SCA “permits the Government to compel the
disclosure of certain telecommunications records when it ‘offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the records sought ‘are relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.’” Id. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
93 Id. at 2212.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 2212–13. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Carpenter did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the CSLI because he voluntarily conveyed that information to his
wireless carriers. Id. at 2213.
96 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (explaining that the third-party
doctrine states that an individual “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government”).
97 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (“The Government’s primary contention . . . is that the
third-party doctrine governs this case. In its view, cell-site records are fair game because they
are ‘business records’ created and maintained by the wireless carriers.”).
89
90
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private search doctrine, the third-party doctrine states that an
individual maintains no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information that is voluntarily conveyed to third parties.98 The
Court disagreed with the government’s argument and explained
that “the seismic shifts in digital technology” allow wireless carriers
to track Carpenter’s, and everyone else’s, location for many years,
which brings this case outside of the outdated third-party doctrine
framework.99 Unlike typical witnesses, entities such as Sprint “are
ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible.”100 Furthermore,
the Court reasoned that CSLI is not necessarily “shared” because
cell phones have become such an integral, indispensable part of
everyday life.101 Thus, individuals may preserve a reasonable
expectation of privacy and maintain their Fourth Amendment
protection in some circumstances in which a third party possesses
their private information.102 In these situations, the government’s
intrusion on privacy damages everyone, not just those under
investigation.103

IV. EXCLUDING THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE FROM
FACEBOOK DATA
The Court’s reasoning in Carpenter logically extends to Facebook
data that is not readily made available to the public. Although this
information is conveyed to Facebook, social media users maintain a
98 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him
to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.”).
99 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 2220.
102 See id. at 2217 (“Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that
the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth
Amendment protection.”).
103 See id. at 2218 (“[T]he retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a
category of information otherwise unknowable. . . . Critically, because location information is
continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United States—not just those
belonging to persons who might happen to come under investigation—this newfound tracking
capacity runs against everyone. . . . Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless
and absolute surveillance.”).
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reasonable expectation of privacy in data that other Facebook
users—including “friends”—cannot access.104 Further, this
expectation is reasonable and, like CSLI data, is not voluntarily
conveyed.105 This Part begins by drawing similarities between the
data obtained by the government in Jones, Carpenter, and other
cases and the data collected by Facebook. Next, Section IV.B
suggests that information collected by Facebook has the potential to
warrant even greater privacy concerns than those in Jones and
Carpenter if that information becomes available to law enforcement.
Last, Section IV.C argues that the private search doctrine should be
excluded from the Facebook data collection context and proposes a
bright-line rule for when a warrant should be required to obtain this
information.
A. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN FACEBOOK DATA

A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court seems prepared to
recognize an expectation of privacy in Facebook data due to that
data’s comprehensiveness and the type of information it reveals
about its users. The Jones shadow majority supported an
expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness of certain types of
information sought.106 In his concurrence, Justice Alito stated that
society has an expectation that the government will not—and
cannot—“secretly monitor and catalogue [an individual’s] every
single movement” for an extended period.107 Justice Sotomayor
expanded on this idea by positing that data collected by methods
such as GPS monitoring create an extensive “record of a person’s
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
See, e.g., Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d
589, 603–04, 606 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that Plaintiffs pleaded a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their Facebook data sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when
Plaintiffs alleged that Facebook “compiled highly personalized profiles from sensitive
browsing histories and habits”).
105 See id. at 603 (describing Facebook’s alleged data collection methods as “surreptitious
and unseen”).
106 See Kaminski, supra note 85(stating that the Jones shadow majority recognized that
“more sophisticated, pervasive, persistent surveillance of location data” is qualitatively
different than other modes of surveillance and reveals sensitive information that warrants
Fourth Amendment protection).
107 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
104
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political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”108 The
Fourth Amendment does not protect general location information
that is uncontextualized; rather, it protects against the collection of
private and detailed information in the aggregate that goes beyond
what a single record could reveal.109 In Carpenter, the Court also
supported an expectation of privacy concerning detailed, aggregated
information compiled every day over a span of several years.110
Similar to GPS monitoring or CSLI that can track an individual’s
movements precisely, Facebook compiles detailed information about
its users that, in the aggregate, presents an even greater privacy
concern than the information collected in Jones and Carpenter
did.111 Since its inception in 2004, Facebook has changed the way
society communicates: much of what was once done by letter or
email, or even by face-to-face communication, is now done by
posting on a “friend’s” Facebook page or sending a message through
Messenger. This communication revolution has been accompanied
by a seismic shift in technology that has made it easier to monitor
Facebook’s millions of users.112
Facebook’s collection of location information is sufficient to
trigger the Court’s concerns articulated in Carpenter and Jones.
When a user logs on to Facebook, the site collects the most recent
location recorded by the device used to log on.113 Furthermore,
Facebook records the location of a device’s nearby Wi-Fi points and

Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014) (noting that the expansive data
contained in cell phones implicate greater privacy concerns than the limited information
revealed by physical records); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that
information obtained that could not otherwise be obtained absent a physical “intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area” by technology that is not generally used by the public
constitutes a search protected by the Fourth Amendment (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”).
110 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“Yet this case is not about
‘using a phone’ or a person’s movement at a particular time. It is about a detailed chronicle
of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years.”).
111 See discussion supra Part II.
112 Compare Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (noting that CSLI led to a “seismic shift[] in
digital technology”), with supra text accompanying notes 1–5 (describing the enormous
technological shift associated with Facebook’s rise in popularity).
113 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
108
109
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cell towers, and if the setting is turned on, a user’s GPS location.114
A court should find that this information alone is sufficient to
warrant Fourth Amendment protection. Like the CSLI at issue in
Carpenter, Facebook’s data collection practices allow the company
to track its users’ location for many years.115 And just like a wireless
carrier, Facebook is always alert, and its memory as a witness is
almost infallible.116 Although Facebook gives its users the option to
turn off location services,117 Facebook still accesses location
information to understand a user’s internet connection and to
enable its “check-in” and “events” features.118 Thus, there is no way
to truly opt out of having location information collected without
deleting Facebook altogether. Because the average user spends
roughly one hour on Facebook per day, the location information
gathered over time is substantial.119
But Facebook does not stop at collecting location information.
Facebook also tracks recently viewed ads and articles, videos
watched, the number of times a user interacts with different
Groups, how many times a user has viewed the Dating and Events
sections, and recently viewed items and interactions on
Marketplace.120 Compiling all of this information reveals a person’s

See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
See Aimee Picchi, OK, You’ve Deleted Facebook, But Is Your Data Still Out There?, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 23, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ok-youve-deleted-facebookbut-is-your-data-still-out-there/ (noting that Facebook retains “log data—a record of what a
user does, such as when they log in, click on a Facebook group or post a comment” indefinitely,
even after a user deletes their account).
116 See, e.g., supra note 100 and accompanying text.
117 On iOS devices, for example, a user may set location services to “Always,” “While Using,”
or
“Never.”
See
Facebook
and
Location,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/337244676357509 (last visited Jan. 29, 2022) (describing
these options further).
118 See id. (“When Location Services and Location History are turned off, we may still
estimate your location using things like check-ins, events and information about your
internet connection.”).
119 See Marie Ennis-O’Connor, How Much Time Do People Spend on Social Media in 2019?,
MEDIUM (Aug. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@JBBC/how-much-time-do-people-spend-onsocial-media-in-2019-infographic-cc02c63bede8 (stating that people spend an average of fiftyeight minutes per day on Facebook globally). Ennis-O’Connor also notes that people spend
fifty-three minutes per day on Instagram, which is noteworthy because Instagram is a
subsidiary of Facebook. Id.; supra note 18.
120 See supra notes 1–13 and accompanying text.
114
115
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most intimate personal affairs in detail.121 Allowing the government
access to this information without a warrant may allow it to see, for
example, that a person has frequently viewed support pages for how
to come out as gay to one’s family or pages of various medical offices
specializing in cancer treatment. All of this data would make it
possible to reconstruct “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life”
through information otherwise only known by the user.122 Because
of the detailed wealth of information that Facebook collects, access
to such information by the government constitutes a search under
the Court’s recent opinions in Jones, Riley, and Carpenter.
B. EXCLUDING THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE FROM THE
COLLECTION OF FACEBOOK DATA

In Carpenter, the Court declined to extend the third-party
doctrine to the collection of CSLI due to the “unique nature of cell
phone location information.”123 The Court’s holding relied on the
fact that the location information was not truly “shared” and that
“seismic shifts in digital technology” made it possible to gather
much more information over a longer period of time than other
surveillance methods.124 The above Section applies the seismicshifts-in-technology argument to Facebook information;125 this
Section focuses on the issue of voluntariness.
The Carpenter Court stated that CSLI is not fully voluntarily
shared information.126 First, the Court noted that cell phones have
become such an integral part of everyday life that they are
121 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(warning against allowing the government access to a comprehensive record of a person’s
movement that reveals a wealth of detailed, personal information); Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014) (“An Internet search and browsing history . . . could reveal an
individual’s private interests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease,
coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.”).
122 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 394 (noting this concern regarding a cell phone’s storage capacity
and ability to store many different types of information).
123 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
124 Id. at 2219–20.
125 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
126 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Cell phone location information is not truly ‘shared’
as one normally understands the term.”).
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“indispensable to participation in modern society.”127 The
“indispensable” role that cell phones play in modern society makes
it less likely that individuals knowingly assume the risk that a
private party will access their information.128 The pervasive use of
Facebook weighs heavily in favor of extending Carpenter’s
reasoning to non-public Facebook information. There are 297
million Facebook users in the United States.129 Individuals use
Facebook to stay in touch with friends and family, participate in
political and civic activities, read the news, and perform workrelated matters.130 Moreover, Facebook and other social media
platforms have become an integral part to maintaining friendships,
and even romantic relationships, among younger Americans.131 In a
way, Facebook has become the modern-day public square where
people go to meet others, get caught up on current events, and
express their opinions.132 Thus, like cell phones, Facebook is so
indispensable to everyday life that individuals do not knowingly
127 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 385 (noting that cell phones
“are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars
might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy”).
128 See Sarah A. Mezera, Note, Carpenter’s Legacy: Limiting the Scope of the Electronic
Private Search Doctrine, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1487, 1498–99 (2019) (“The indispensable nature
of cell phones and electronic devices in modern society decreases the likelihood that a person
is knowingly assuming the risk that a third party will view their information. . . . In essence,
our electronic devices have become extensions of ourselves. They follow us wherever we go
and record our lives in detail.”).
129 Compare Statista Rsch. Dep’t, supra note 3 (indicating there were 297 million Facebook
users in the United States in 2020 and an estimated 302 million in 2021), with Carpenter,
138 S. Ct. at 2211 (“There are 396 million cell phone service accounts in the United
States . . . .”).
130 See Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of
Privacy Concerns, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacyconcerns/ (“[W]e have documented how social media play a role in the way people participate
in civic and political activities, launch and sustain protests, get and share health information,
gather scientific information, engage in family matters, perform job-related activities and get
news.”).
131 See id. (“Teenagers are especially likely to report that social media are important to
their friendships and, at times, their romantic relationships.”).
132 See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (explaining that
Facebook and other social media sites have become “what for many are the principal sources
for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the
modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and
knowledge”).
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assume the risk of a private party accessing their information by
logging on to the website.
Second, the Court in Carpenter noted that the mobile carriers
logged CSLI records without “any affirmative act [by] the user
beyond powering up” the device and receiving incoming texts, calls,
and other notifications.133 Admittedly, Facebook does not log user
records at the same level of passivity at which cell carriers log CSLI
records; Facebook does, however, collect user data when users are
not using Facebook and does not give users an absolute ability to
avoid having their information collected while using Facebook’s
services.134 Even when a user turns off location services, Facebook
still has access to that user’s location information to monitor the
user’s internet connection and enable various features.135
Additionally, Facebook’s cookies policy records information
automatically without an individual visiting Facebook when that
individual visits a website featuring the Facebook “like” or "share”
buttons.136 Because Facebook’s “like” button appears on over eight
million websites, it is difficult to avoid websites that use
Facebook.137 Therefore, unless they delete their accounts, there is
no way for Facebook users to avoid having their private information
recorded by Facebook without deleting their accounts. This
ubiquitous use of Facebook’s “like” and “share” buttons on websites
cuts against the belief that individuals voluntarily assume the risk
of private parties disclosing their information to police.138
C. DRAWING THE LINE: WHAT INFORMATION MAY LAW
ENFORCEMENT REVIEW WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A WARRANT?

Determining what information from Facebook law enforcement
may review should turn on whether an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that information.139 To start, law
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
See supra notes 29–30 & 93–94 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
137 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
138 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (making a similar argument regarding the third-party
doctrine based on information gathered by CSLI because “there is no way to avoid” having
that information recorded other than to disconnect one’s device from the network entirely).
139 See discussion supra Section III.A (identifying this standard as the first inquiry for
133
134
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enforcement may view any information that would otherwise be
viewable to other Facebook users because individuals do not have
any legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
conveyed to others.140 Therefore, even if people believe that all of
their Facebook “friends” are loyal to them, if a “friend” turns out to
be a government informant or an undercover officer and reports
Facebook information that is visible to other “friends,” the police
should be able to use that information. This information includes
posts, private messages, “likes,” “shares,” and pages and people
followed.141 Police departments frequently obtain this information
by monitoring a person’s page or specific hashtags and by
“friending” individuals from undercover accounts.142 Likewise,
Facebook could report this information on its own accord without
conducting a Fourth Amendment “search” because the expectation
of privacy in information made available to other users is already
null. These types of information differ from other, nonpublic
information—such as location information, cookies, and recently
visited pages—because Facebook is the only entity that can see that
information.143 In those cases, individuals maintain a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
Doctrine determining when nonpublic information becomes
comprehensive enough to warrant Fourth Amendment protection is
determining whether a search occurs under the Fourth Amendment).
140 Cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (“[H]owever strongly a defendant
may trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly
communicating with the authorities.” (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966))).
141 See United States v. Stratton, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1241 (D. Kan. 2017) (finding that
the defendant “lost any reasonable expectation of privacy” in messages sent via Play Station
Network to other users). But see United States v. Chavez, 423 F. Supp. 3d 194, 204–05
(W.D.N.C. 2019) (finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in any
“non-public” information on Facebook, including private posts and private messages). Chavez
invokes a broader privacy protection than this Note proposes. This Note accounts for White
in determining reasonable expectations of privacy in social media information, but Chavez
makes no mention of the case and only mentions Hoffa in passing. Id. at 203 n.4.
Nevertheless, the Chavez court agrees that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in nonpublic information on Facebook. Id. at 205.
142 See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Government Access to and Manipulation of Social
Media: Legal and Policy Challenges, 61 HOW. L.J. 523, 525–26 (2018) (identifying methods
used by law enforcement to surveil social media).
143 See supra notes 26–27, 32 and accompanying text.
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currently underdeveloped by the courts144 and will depend on how
future courts answer the question. For example, is
comprehensiveness determined by the amount of data collected and
its accuracy or by the frequency at which the data is collected?145
Regardless of which analysis is used, courts should develop and
follow a bright-line rule to determine comprehensiveness, such as
Carpenter’s seven-day rule,146 because of the similarities between
nonpublic information and CSLI in the breadth of information they
contain, the opportunity they offer the government to reconstruct
intimate details about a person’s life, and the feasibility of collecting
the information.
Furthermore, courts should recognize that a Fourth Amendment
search occurs when multiple types of nonpublic Facebook data are
disclosed to law enforcement.147 This disclosure would occur, for
example, when Facebook attempts to share a user’s log-in location
information and recently watched video history. When more than
one type of private information is disclosed, individuals are at
greater risk of having intimate details of their lives made available
to the government than they would be if only one type of information
was disclosed.148 Due to this significant privacy concern, courts
should deem it a Fourth Amendment search when more than one

144 See Daniel de Zayas, Comment, Carpenter v. United States and the Emerging
Expectation of Privacy in Data Comprehensiveness Applied to Browsing History, 68 AM. U. L.
REV. 2209, 2213 (2019) (“Courts developed the third-party doctrine in a series of cases during
the age of analog technology and left it almost undisturbed as society transitioned into the
modern digital age.”).
145 See de Zayas, supra note 144, at 2248 (identifying these distinct potential modes of
analysis); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212, 2219 (2018) (noting that
the government obtained nearly 13,000 location points that could identify an individual’s
location within 50 meters); Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d
521, 524–25 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that collecting smart-meter data, meaning data showing
“both the amount of electricity being used inside a home and when that energy is used,” in
intervals of fifteen minutes is a “search”).
146 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3 (stating that seven days of CSLI collection is a
search under the Fourth Amendment).
147 See Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589,
604 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
“highly personalized profiles from sensitive browsing histories and habits” that Facebook had
compiled).
148 See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
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type of nonpublic Facebook data is disclosed to law enforcement,
regardless of how many days the information covers.

V. ANSWERING POTENTIAL CRITICISM
Some argue that protecting this information under the Fourth
Amendment will hinder law enforcement efforts.149 As such, because
nearly three-quarters of law enforcement agencies use social media
to investigate crime,150 requiring the government to obtain a
warrant before reviewing this information may make it more
difficult for law enforcement to investigate and arrest suspected
criminals.151 Others argue that protecting this information presents
a public safety risk because social media information can be
extremely valuable for surveillance purposes.152 For example,
granting law enforcement access to this information allows it to
save investigatory resources and time while increasing its
surveillance capacity to better protect the public.153
These criticisms are largely unfounded. While there may be
times when law enforcement will be unable to access nonpublic
social media information because it lacks probable cause to obtain a
warrant,154 such situations would not justify the invasion of privacy
149 See Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Split on Private Search Doctrine for
POST:
THE
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(May
20,
2015),
Computers,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/20/sixth-circuitcreates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-computers (explaining that probable
cause to obtain a warrant is not always met by the report of a private party that has already
performed a search).
150 See Levinson-Waldman, supra note 142, at 524 (“[I]n a 2016 survey of over 500 domestic
law enforcement agencies, three-quarters reported that they use social media to solicit tips
on crime, and nearly the same number use it to . . . gather intelligence for investigations.”).
151 See Benjamin Holley, Note, Digitizing the Fourth Amendment: Limiting the Private
Search Exception in Computer Investigations, 96 VA. L. REV. 677, 712 (2010) (addressing the
argument “that narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement hinder police investigation,
making it more difficult to find and arrest criminals”).
152 See Christopher L. Izant, Note, Equal Access to Public Communications Data for Social
Media Surveillance Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 237–38 (2017) (“[T]he ability to view
and organize [social media surveillance] data [by law enforcement] at the developer level is
essential to capture the maximum intelligence value of social media communications.”).
153 See id. at 238–39 (stating that social media can expose potential public safety threats
and allow agencies to respond quickly, while at the same time reducing resources expended
on surveillance).
154 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (stating that probable cause is met when
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that would ensue. Requiring a warrant based on probable cause in
these situations ensures that the question of whether access to the
information should be allowed is determined by a neutral and
detached magistrate judge, rather than by a police officer with
hurried judgment,155 or even the judgment of an algorithm
developed by Facebook.156 Further, there are other sources of
information available for the government to investigate crimes that
provide similar relevant information, such as surveillance cameras,
eyewitnesses, and individual informants. Due to the wealth of
personal information contained in nonpublic social media data, an
individual’s privacy interest should outweigh the interest of law
enforcement in obtaining this information without a warrant.
Likewise, it is unclear how useful nonpublic social media
information is in preventing crime and mitigating public safety
risks. Law enforcement may still access public information such as
social media posts, followed or “liked” pages, and group membership
without obtaining a warrant.157 For example, in 2019, the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in Southern Florida arrested and charged a
Florida man based on FBI surveillance of his “violent, misogynistic
and extremist social media posts and messages” that led the FBI to
the man’s plan to coordinate an ISIS attack against deans at two
colleges he previously attended.158 Also in 2019, a woman in
Wisconsin pleaded guilty to crimes related to using Facebook
accounts to “pledge [her] allegiance to ISIS, recruit new members
for the terrorist group,” and encourage individuals to engage in

there is a likelihood of criminal activity based on the “factual and practical considerations”
(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949))).
155 See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979) (“We have repeatedly said
that a warrant authorized by a neutral and detached judicial officer is ‘a more reliable
safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer
“engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”’” (quoting United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977))).
156 See supra notes 8–10.
157 Any reasonable expectation of privacy in this information by a user is null because it is
already viewable by their Facebook “friends.” See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying
text.
158 Kim Bellware, A Man Plotted an ISIS Attack in Revenge for Getting Kicked Out of
POST
(Nov.
27,
2019),
College
in
Florida,
Authorities
Say,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/11/26/man-plotted-an-isis-attack-revengegetting-kicked-out-college-authorities-say/.
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terrorism.159 Such surveillance is permissible under the rule
outlined above because police only accessed information that was
viewable to other users. Even if Facebook automatically disclosed
this information to law enforcement (instead of law enforcement
obtaining the information on its own), this practice would not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
Furthermore, the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant
requirement will apply if the public safety threat is credible
enough.160 The exigent circumstance exception applies when law
enforcement has “the need to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence in individual cases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, and to
assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with
imminent injury.”161 Thus, even with the robust warrant
requirement proposed here, exceptions apply to help law
enforcement and ensure public safety.

VI. CONCLUSION
If Facebook discloses information to law enforcement that is not
available to other users, courts should protect such information
because of its potential to reveal a mosaic of an individual’s life.
Unlike other information available under the private search
doctrine, disclosure of this information is not truly voluntary. The
Court’s reasoning in Carpenter and the shadow majority’s reasoning
in Jones logically extend to protect an individual’s privacy interest
in nonpublic Facebook information under the Fourth Amendment.
As such, courts should exclude this information from the private
search doctrine and hold that it may not be viewed by law
enforcement absent a warrant.

Liam Stack, Wisconsin Woman Used Hacked Facebook Accounts to Recruit for ISIS,
TIMES
(Apr.
22,
2019),
Prosecutors
Say,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/us/wisconsin-woman-isis.html.
160 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 402 (2014) (stating that the exigent circumstance
exception applies when the urgency of a situation makes law enforcement’s needs so
compelling that a warrantless search becomes “objectively reasonable” (quoting Kentucky v.
King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011))).
161 Id.
159
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